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SAME-SEX DIVORCE AND WISCONSIN COURTS:
IMPERFECT HARMONY?
I.

INTRODUCTION

It is no secret that same-sex marriage is one of the most controversial
issues facing both the public and private sectors.1 In recent years state
governments have come down on both sides of the issue, either creating
statutes and common-law precedents that allow various forms of legal
recognition for same-sex relationships2 or creating statutes and constitutional
amendments to ban legal unions between homosexuals. 3 One of the issues
1. See, e.g., Sylvia Honig, Letter to the Editor, Same-Sex Couples Are Making Reasonable,
Decent Marriage Request, TIMES UNION (Albany), June 30, 2007, at A8 (describing the controversy
regarding same-sex marriage and the difficulties of finding a solution).
2. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297–299.6 (West 2004 & Supp. 2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46b38aa–pp (West Supp. 2008); D.C. CODE § 32-701(3)–(4) (2001); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 572C1–7 (LexisNexis 2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 457-A:1–8 (Supp. 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN §§ 37:128–36 (West Supp. 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201–07 (2002); Act of July 30, 2004, ch. 672,
2004 Me. Laws 2126, 2126–31; S.B. 566, 425th Leg., 2008 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2008); S.B. 597, 425th
Leg., 2008 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2008); H.B. 2007, 74th Leg., 2007 Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007); Act of April
20, 2007, ch. 155, 2007 Wash. Sess. Laws 616, 616–19; Kerrigan v. Comm‘r of Pub. Health, 957
A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); C.M. v.
C.C., 867 N.Y.S.2d 884 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008). Additionally, although Rhode Island does not
currently have any laws denying or allowing legal recognition of same-sex relationships, the Rhode
Island attorney general has issued an opinion that ―Rhode Island will recognize same sex marriages
lawfully performed in Massachusetts as marriages in Rhode Island.‖ Letter from Patrick C. Lynch,
R.I. Att‘y Gen., to Jack R. Warner, Comm‘r, R.I. Bd. of Governors for Higher Educ. 6 (Feb. 20,
2007), available at http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/cases/ri-ag-statement.pdf; see also Letter from
Stuart Rabner, N.J. Att‘y Gen., to Joseph Komosinski, State Registrar of Vital Statistics 1 (Feb. 16,
2007), available at http://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases07/ag-formal-opinion-2.16.07.pdf (stating
that ―government-sanctioned, same-sex relationships validly established under the laws of other
States . . . will be valid in New Jersey . . . either as civil unions or domestic partnerships‖). These
letters were issued in response to a Massachusetts superior court judge‘s ruling that ―same-sex
marriage is not prohibited in Rhode Island.‖ See Cote-Whiteacre v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, No. 042656, 2006 WL 3208758, at *4 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Sept. 29, 2006).
3. E.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 36.03; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25; ARIZ. CONST. art. XXX, § 1;
ARK. CONST. amend. LXXXIII, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 31; FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 27; GA. CONST. art. I, § 4, ¶ 1; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 (giving the Hawaii
legislature the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples, which it did in HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 572-1 (LexisNexis 2005)); IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 28; KAN . CONST. art. XV, § 16; KY .
CONST. § 233a; LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25; MISS. CONST. art. XIV,
§ 263A; MO. CONST. art. I, § 33; MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 7; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29, invalidated
by Citizens for Equal Protection, Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Neb. 2005); NEV. CONST.
art. I, § 21; N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28; OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 35; OR.
CONST. art. XV, § 5a; S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 15; S.D. CONST. art. XXI, § 9; TENN. CONST. art. XI,
§ 18; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29; VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A; WIS. CONST. art.
XIII, § 13; WIS. STAT. § 765.001(2) (2007–2008); WIS. STAT. § 765.04(1) (2007–2008).
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hiding behind this hot-button topic, however, is how same-sex couples,
specifically those who have achieved legal recognition of their relationships,
legally dissolve their unions.
As all too many couples know,4 such dissolutions entail numerous court
dates, filings, and expenses, and they often involve quarreling and hostility
between the parties. Now that same-sex couples are quickly achieving greater
recognition of their relationships, they must also deal with these struggles to
end them. The purpose of this Comment is to examine how legally
recognized same-sex couples would, or should be able to, obtain legal
dissolution in states that do not recognize same-sex marriage, particularly in
Wisconsin.
Following the Introduction, Part II of this Comment examines examples
of the various federal and state frameworks for same-sex marriage and
divorce, to provide a frame of reference in examining how Wisconsin courts
should treat same-sex divorce. To that same end, this Comment looks at
recent state-court decisions in Rhode Island5 and New York, 6 each of which
deals with a same-sex couple‘s attempt to legally dissolve their relationship.
After a brief history of the same-sex marriage debate in Wisconsin, including
the recent prohibitory constitutional amendment, 7 Part III of this Comment
will present a detailed explanation of three possible methods of handling
same-sex divorce in Wisconsin.
These three possible solutions are based on various policy and legal
considerations and consist of the following: 1) barring access to the
Wisconsin courts entirely for dissolution proceedings; 2) allowing the samesex partners into court and applying Wisconsin law to adjudicate the divorce;
or 3) allowing the same-sex partners into court and applying the laws of the
state where the relationship was founded. Each presents its own difficulties
and justifications, all of which will be explored in detail in Part III.

Interestingly, Virginia‘s constitutional amendment is the only one that not only bars same-sex
marriage, but also excludes recognition of civil unions and private partnership contracts between
same-sex partners. For a full list of states with anti-same-sex marriage constitutional amendments
and statutes, see NAT ‘L CONF. OF STATE LEGS., SAME SEX MARRIAGE, CIVIL UNIONS, AND
DOMESTIC P ARTNERSHIPS (2008), http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/samesex.htm (last visited Jan.
6, 2009) [hereinafter SAME SEX MARRIAGE].
4. See WIS. DEP‘T OF HEALTH & FAMILY SERVS., DIV. OF PUB. HEALTH, BUREAU OF HEALTH
INFO. & P OLICY, WISCONSIN MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES 2006, 12 (2007), available at
http://dhfs.wisconsin.gov/stats/pdf/06mardiv.pdf (showing that in 2006, the total number of divorces
was 16,730, or 50% of the total number of marriages in the same year).
5. Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956 (R.I. 2007).
6. C.M. v. C.C., 867 N.Y.S.2d 884 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008); Gonzalez v. Green, 831 N.Y.S.2d 856
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006).
7. WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § 13.
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II. FEDERAL AND STATE FRAMEWORKS
To understand the nature of the same-sex divorce question and its
surrounding issues, it is helpful to first survey examples of federal and nonWisconsin state frameworks for handling this issue. The primary federal law
on point is the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which was signed into law
by President Bill Clinton.8 At the state level, thirteen states, along with the
District of Columbia, have some form of legal recognition for same-sex
relationships, 9 and many also have developed legal methods for dissolving
these relationships.10
Because DOMA preceded many of these states‘ efforts, section A of this
Part examines DOMA in depth, discussing its history, purpose, and
implications for Wisconsin in dealing with the issue of same-sex divorce.
Section B then examines the evolution of same-sex marriage and divorce in
Massachusetts, followed by an analysis of three recent cases dealing with
same-sex divorce, one from Rhode Island11 and two from New York.12 These
8. See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104–199, §§ 2–3, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996)
(codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)). DOMA is a two-part statute. The
Title 28 portion reads:
§ 1738C. Certain acts, records, and proceedings and the effect thereof
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall
be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of
any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship
between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws
of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising
from such relationship.
28 U.S.C. § 1738C (emphasis added).
The Title 1 portion reads:
§ 7. Definition of ―marriage‖ and ―spouse‖
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling,
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and
agencies of the United States, the word ―marriage‖ means only a legal union
between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word
―spouse‖ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a
wife.
1 U.S.C. § 7 (emphasis added).
9. See sources cited supra note 2 and accompanying text.
10. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 4 (West 2007) (detailing divorce procedures for
both heterosexual and homosexual married couples); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1206 (2002) (―The
dissolution of civil unions shall follow the same procedure and be subject to the same substantive
rights and obligations that are involved with the dissolution of marriage . . . .‖).
11. Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956 (R.I. 2007).
12. C.M. v. C.C., 867 N.Y.S.2d 884 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008); Gonzalez v. Green, 831 N.Y.S.2d
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three non-Wisconsin examples all will shed light on Wisconsin‘s options for
handling same-sex divorce when the need to do so arises.

A. The Defense of Marriage Act
1. Historical Background
Congress passed DOMA, in part, in response to the Hawaii case Baehr v.
Lewin.13 This case began in 1991, when three Hawaiian homosexual couples
filed a civil lawsuit in state court challenging the Hawaii Department of
Health‘s denial of their applications for marriage licenses.14 Specifically, the
plaintiffs claimed that their equal protection rights under the Hawaii
Constitution were being violated, in that they were being discriminated
against on the basis of sex. 15 The trial court granted judgment on the
pleadings to the Department, but the Hawaii Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the plaintiffs were entitled to an evidentiary hearing on their equal
protection claim. 16 The court further held that sex qualified as a ―suspect
category‖ under the Hawaii Constitution, and therefore, any law that
discriminated on that basis would be subject ―to some form of heightened
[judicial] scrutiny‖ when challenged on equal protection grounds.17
The federal House Committee on the Judiciary responded directly to the
Hawaii Supreme Court‘s Baehr decision in its report to the House of
Representatives, where it stated in no uncertain terms that H.R. 3396, the bill
proposing DOMA, was a ―response to a very particular development in the
State of Hawaii,‖ specifically the fact that Hawaii ―appear[ed] to be on the
verge of requiring that State to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples.‖ 18
In light of the Baehr case, and what the Committee on the Judiciary termed
―[t]he legal assault against traditional heterosexual marriage laws,‖ 19 Congress
passed DOMA on September 21, 1996.20
2. DOMA‘s Dual Purposes
The House Committee on the Judiciary set forth two primary purposes for
DOMA: 1) ―to defend the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage‖ and
856 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006).
13. 852 P.2d 44, 48–52 (Haw. 1993); see also H.R. REP. NO. 104–664, at 4–6 (1996), reprinted
in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2908–10.
14. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 48–49.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 68.
17. Id. at 65, 67 (internal quotations omitted).
18. H.R. REP. NO. 104–664, at 2.
19. Id. at 4.
20. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104–199, 110 Stat. 2419, 2420 (1996).
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2) ―to protect the right of the States to formulate their own public policy
regarding the legal recognition of same-sex unions, free from any federal
constitutional implications that might attend the recognition by one State of
the right for homosexual couples to acquire marriage licenses.‖21 Public Law
104-199, DOMA‘s enacting legislation, further states that DOMA is ―[a]n Act
to define and protect the institution of marriage.‖ 22 Essentially, DOMA was
enacted to prevent one state‘s recognition of same-sex marriage from forcing
recognition of such marriages on other states through the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the United States Constitution. 23
3. Implications for Wisconsin
On the state level, the passage of DOMA represents a congressional
delegation to the individual states of the decision whether to recognize out-ofstate, same-sex unions. Thus, Congress presumably also has left the decision
of how to deal with the dissolution of these out-of-state unions to the
individual states. This delegation of authority seems particularly likely
because regulation of the family historically and presumptively has been
reserved to state governments.24 Given this presumption and DOMA‘s
historical background, it seems clear that there is no federal standard for
handling the issue of same-sex divorce, meaning Wisconsin must look to its
own laws, policies, and courts in deciding how to deal with this situation.
This same-sex divorce policy decision is especially difficult (or perhaps
especially easy25) for states such as Wisconsin that have prohibited same-sex
21. H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 2.
22. Defense of Marriage Act, 110 Stat. at 2419.
23. Article IV, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution reads: ―Full Faith and Credit shall be given in
each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings
shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.‖ Congress apparently used the second sentence of this
Section to justify enacting DOMA, stating in the House Report that this Section logically suggests
that ―[w]hile full faith and credit is the rule—that is, while States are generally obligated to treat laws
of other States as they would their own—Congress retains a discretionary power to carve out such
exceptions as it deems appropriate.‖ H.R. REP. NO. 104–664, at 25–26 (footnote omitted). When
DOMA was initially passed, many critics wondered whether it could pass constitutional muster, i.e.,
whether Congress had the power it claimed to override the Full Faith and Credit Clause. For an
analysis of this question concluding that Congress does indeed have such power, see Lynn D.
Wardle, Non-Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage Judgments Under DOMA and the Constitution, 38
CREIGHTON L. REV. 365, 386–420 (2005). But see Heather Hamilton, The Defense of Marriage Act:
A Critical Analysis of Its Constitutionality Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 47 DEPAUL L.
REV. 943, 973–87 (1998) (analyzing DOMA and concluding that Congress violated the Full Faith
and Credit Clause).
24. See, e.g., Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 151 (2001) (―There is indeed a presumption
against [federal law] pre-emption in areas of traditional state regulation such as family law.‖).
25. Given the multitude of states that have enacted either statutes or constitutional amendments
banning same-sex legal unions, see supra note 3, it is likely that many states would choose to
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marriage by statute, constitutional amendment, or common-law decision. 26
These states already have taken a large step away from the legal recognition
of same-sex couples, and the decision whether to open the courtroom doors to
same-sex couples seeking divorce could either reinforce or undercut that
position. For example, if Wisconsin were to allow court access for same-sex
divorces, in whatever form, people may construe this as an implied
recognition of the legal existence of the relationship, contrary to the public
policies embodied by Wisconsin‘s prohibitory statutes and constitutional
amendment.27 By denying access for same-sex couples, however, Wisconsin
courts would impose hardships on those individuals by forcing them to seek
divorces in their state of union and would further alienate the State of
Wisconsin from the homosexual community. 28
Because of these concerns and potential consequences, Wisconsin courts
must carefully consider their options in handling the same-sex divorce
question. To aid this consideration, it is helpful to examine how states that
have chosen to recognize same-sex unions have dealt with the dissolution of
such relationships, as this will reveal Wisconsin‘s options for handling samesex divorce, including an outright ban. From these examples, perhaps
Wisconsin courts can formulate a method for handling same-sex divorce that
will serve the interests of all those involved. To that end, the next section is
effectively ignore the question by banning same-sex couples from the courtroom for divorce
proceedings. See, e.g., Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 958 (R.I. 2007) (finding that a samesex couple married in Massachusetts could not seek a divorce from the Rhode Island courts); see also
discussion infra Part III.A (examining the justifications and effects of denying same-sex couples
access to divorce proceedings).
26. See supra note 3.
27. See WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § 13; WIS. STAT. § 765.001(2) (2007–2008); WIS. STAT.
§ 765.04(1) (2007–2008) (prohibiting, collectively, both same-sex marriage and civil unions).
28. Forcing homosexual couples to return to their state of legal union is far from the only
hardship imposed by denying these couples legal divorces. These couples must also deal with
various ancillary problems, many of which are a direct result of DOMA‘s limited defin ition of
marriage. Tax deductions for alimony payments, for example, are typically available for divorced
spouses. In the case of same-sex marriage, however, this federal right is denied. Matt Carroll, The
Gay Divorcees: First Came Gay Marriage. Now Comes the Inevitable—and a Slew of
Unprecedented Legal Questions, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 29, 2006, at E4, available at
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2006/01/29/the_gay_divorcees; see also Anthony
C. Infanti, Deconstructing the Duty to the Tax System: Unfettering Zealous Advocacy on Behalf of
Lesbian and Gay Taxpayers, 61 TAX LAW. 407, 422–36 (2008) (discussing the various
discriminatory impacts of the federal tax system on homosexual individuals and same-sex couples).
In addition to the loss of federal rights, same-sex couples may also face difficulties with
seemingly basic aspects of divorce, such as relationship length. Carroll, supra. Because many courts
use this as a factor when determining asset division, courts are forced to decide how long a same-sex
couple has been married. Id. If the couple‘s legal marriage has existed only for a year because of
state laws, however, the court may be forced to look beyond the legal relationship to determine its
length, which may lead to messy balancing tests of highly subjective factors that heterosexual
couples are not forced to endure. Id.
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devoted to discussion of same-sex unions and divorces in Massachusetts,
Rhode Island, and New York, all of which have some form of legal
recognition for same-sex relationships.
B. Same-Sex Marriage and Divorce Outside Wisconsin
There are currently thirteen states, along with the District of Columbia,
that recognize a range of rights for same-sex couples. 29 These states are
California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, 30 Rhode Island, Vermont, and
Washington. 31 Each state has varying forms of legal recognition for same-sex
unions, starting with the lesser forms that grant ―some state-level spousal
rights to unmarried couples,‖ moving all the way up to forms that allow legal
marriages between same-sex partners.32 The next three sections focus on
29. See sources cited supra note 2 and accompanying text.
30. Interestingly, one Oregon county (Multnomah) actually authorized same-sex marriages for
six weeks in early 2004 until a judge ―ordered the county to stop issuing marriage licenses to same
sex-couples‖ pending the outcome of a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of banning same-sex
marriage. Or. Dep‘t of Human Servs., Ctr. for Health Statistics, Current Status: Same-Sex Marriage,
http://www.oregon.gov/DHS/ph/chs/order/samesex.shtml (last visited Jan. 6, 2009). In that lawsuit,
the Oregon Supreme Court ultimately held that Oregon statutory law ―limit[s] the right to obtain
marriage licenses to opposite-sex couples‖ and that ―marriage licenses issued to same-sex couples in
Multnomah County . . . were issued without authority and were void at the time that they were
issued.‖ Li v. State, 110 P.3d 91, 102 (Or. 2005). Thus, although Oregon has passed a domestic
partnership law, see H.B. 2007, 74th Leg., 2007 Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007), it also has outlawed same-sex
marriages, see OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5a.
31. Legislatures in four of these thirteen states, Maine, New Jersey, New York, and Vermont,
are currently considering legislation that would legalize same-sex marriage within the state. Judy
Harrison, Maine Gay Marriage Law Proposed, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Jan. 14, 2009, at 1; General
Assemb. 2978, 2008 Leg., 213th Sess. (N.J. 2008); Jeremy W. Peters, For Supporters of Gay
Marriage, a Dashing of Great Expectations, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2009, at A16; H.R. 178, 2009–2010
Leg. Sess. (Vt. 2009).
32. SAME SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 3. Until May 2008, Massachusetts was the only state to
grant legal marriages to same-sex couples. On May 16, 2008, however, the California Supreme
Court held that ―in view of the substance and significance of the fundamental constitutional right to
form a family relationship, the California Constitution properly must be interpreted to guarantee this
basic civil right to all Californians, whether gay or heterosexual, and to same-sex couples as well as
to opposite-sex couples.‖ In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 400 (Cal. 2008). The victory was
short-lived, however, as California voters passed Proposition 8 in the November 2008 elections,
which amended the California Constitution to read: ―Only marriage between a man and a woman is
valid or recognized in California.‖ CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5; Howard Mintz, Another Wave of Legal
Arguments Filed over California’s Proposition 8, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 6, 2009, at 2B.
As of this Comment‘s printing, state government officials were vigorously challenging Propos ition 8,
alleging that the voters lacked the authority to overturn the California Supreme Court‘s holding in
Marriage Cases that the right to marry is a fundamental right. Mintz, supra; Marriage Cases, 183
P.3d at 400. California was not the only other state to follow Massachusetts‘s lead and recognize
same-sex marriages: in October 2008 the Connecticut Supreme Court held that ―under the equal
protection provisions of the [Connecticut] constitution, our statutory scheme governing marriage
cannot stand insofar as it bars same sex couples from marrying.‖ Kerrigan v. Comm‘r of Pub.
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states at the higher end of this spectrum, namely Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
and New York.
1. Massachusetts
Anyone familiar with the same-sex marriage debate is aware of its origins
in Massachusetts, where in 2003 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
held that the denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples violated the
Massachusetts Constitution‘s due process and equal protection provisions. 33
In 2004, the same court issued an advisory opinion to the Massachusetts
Legislature regarding a potential bill to ban such licenses, and it stated again
that such a ban would violate the state due process and equal protection
clauses and would therefore be unconstitutional. 34
The landmark case of Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, which
ultimately gave same-sex couples in Massachusetts the right to marry, was
decided in November 2003.35 After several homosexual couples were denied
marriage licenses by the Department, they sued the State on the grounds that
the denial constituted a violation of several provisions of the Massachusetts
Constitution.36 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court sided with the
homosexual couples and held:
[T]he absence of any reasonable relationship between, on the
one hand, an absolute disqualification of same-sex couples
who wish to enter into civil marriage and, on the other,
protection of public health, safety, or general welfare,
suggests that the marriage restriction is rooted in persistent
prejudices against persons who are (or who are believed to
be) homosexual. 37
A few months later, the Massachusetts Legislature sought the opinion of
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court as to the constitutionality of Senate
Bill 2175, entitled ―An Act relative to civil unions.‖ 38 If enacted, this bill
Health, 957 A.2d 407, 481 (Conn. 2008). As of this Comment‘s printing, this decision remains
unchallenged. Because Connecticut‘s recognition of same-sex marriage is so recent, however, there
are no reported cases involving actions for same-sex divorce in the Connecticut courts, meaning it is
more valuable to examine the laws of Massachusetts where there are established procedures for such
actions. See 2 CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR. & MONROE L. INKER, MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE
SERIES, FAMILY LAW AND P RACTICE §§ 26–27 (2007) (discussing same-sex divorce procedures).
33. Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961, 969 (Mass. 2003).
34. In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 572 (Mass. 2004).
35. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 941.
36. Id. at 950.
37. Id. at 968.
38. Opinions, 802 N.E.2d at 566.
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would have denied same-sex couples the right to marry, but would have
granted them access to civil unions with all the ―‗benefits, protections, rights
and responsibilities‘ of marriage.‖39 In its 2004 opinion to the Senate, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court echoed its Goodridge decision and
stated that this bill, as written, would violate the Massachusetts Constitution‘s
due process and equal protection provisions. 40 The court recommended that it
not be enacted, and the legislature followed the court‘s advice. 41 Thus, as a
result of the Goodridge decision, same-sex couples were granted the right to
marry in Massachusetts, and they applied for marriage licenses in droves. 42
Inevitably, the recognition of same-sex marriage in Massachusetts led to
the advent of same-sex divorces within that state. One news article postulated
that of the estimated 10,000 homosexual couples that have taken advantage of
the change in Massachusetts marriage law, dozens have attempted to dissolve
their relationships through the court system. 43 To achieve such dissolution,
current Massachusetts law provides that homosexual couples, just like
heterosexuals, must establish domicile within Massachusetts to grant the
courts subject-matter jurisdiction over the divorce.44 In addition, new
residents of Massachusetts are required to comply with a ―durational
residency requirement,‖ under which they must live in Massachusetts for one
year before applying for divorce.45
39. Id.
40. Id. at 572.
41. Id.
42. Pam Belluck, Same-Sex Marriage: The Overview; Hundreds of Same-Sex Couples Wed in
Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2004, at A1. Because the decision to grant same-sex marriages
in the first place was made by the Massachusetts Supreme Court and not the legislature, it is not
surprising that lawmakers attempted to have their say by working to place a constitutional
amendment to ban gay marriage on the 2008 ballot. Frank Phillips & Lisa Wangsness, Same-Sex
Marriage Ban Advances, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 3, 2007, at A1. This attempt was ultimately defeated,
however, when the ban failed to receive enough votes in its second legislative hearing, thereby
preventing its placement on the 2008 ballot. Frank Phillips & Andrea Estes, Right of Gays to Marry
Set for Years to Come, BOSTON GLOBE, June 15, 2007, at A1.
43. Dafna Linzer, Same-Sex Divorce Tests U.S. Legal System: Gay Couples Face
Complications that Heterosexuals Don’t Encounter, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Jan. 6, 2008, at A10.
44. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 4 (West 2007). As one observer notes regarding
achieving domicile in Massachusetts:
The law governing domicile is well established and fact-intensive. This means
that to get a divorce [in Massachusetts] a same-sex spouse who is domiciled
elsewhere will have to . . . make Massachusetts his or her permanent place of
abode, i.e.[,] there will have to be sufficient indicia of domicile in the event it is
challenged in the divorce or (more significantly) the issue of the validity of
domicile and the divorce is challenged at some future date.
KINDREGAN & INKER, supra note 32, § 26:19.
45. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 208, § 5 (West 2007); see also KINDREGAN & INKER, supra
note 32, § 27:4.
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Provided the spouse seeking dissolution of the same-sex marriage
complies with these statutory requirements, his or her petition for divorce will
proceed similarly to that of heterosexual spouses. 46 That is not to say,
however, that same-sex couples encounter substantially the same difficulties
as heterosexual couples. Because DOMA defines marriage as only between a
man and a woman, 47 any federal rights that are typically granted to
heterosexual couples upon divorce are denied to homosexual divorcees, as
their marriage never existed under federal law. 48 Rights to pensions, tax
deductions for alimony payments, and medical coverage are only some of the
federal rights that are thus denied to divorcing homosexual couples. 49 As a
result, despite the increase in rights given to same-sex couples under
Massachusetts laws, there is little doubt that these rights still fall short of
those given to heterosexual couples.
Because of Massachusetts‘s recognition of same-sex marriage,
homosexual couples flocked to that state to obtain marriage licenses, and
subsequently returned to their home states with apparent validation in tow. 50
As some of these relationships broke down, however, the couples were forced
to seek legal dissolution of the marriage. As discussed earlier, a return to
Massachusetts for such a proceeding entailed difficult domicile and durational
residency requirements, prices that many couples were not willing to pay. 51
Thus, to achieve dissolution, couples began seeking legal divorces in the
courts of their current domiciliary state. Three examples of such couples are
examined below.

46. For a more in-depth examination of same-sex divorce law in Massachusetts, see
KINDREGAN & INKER, supra note 32.
47. For further discussion of DOMA, see supra Part II.A.
48. See KINDREGAN, & INKER, supra note 32, § 26:19; Infanti, supra note 28; Linzer, supra
note 43.
49. See KINDREGAN & INKER, supra note 32, § 26:19; Linzer, supra note 43.
50. See Belluck, supra note 42. But see MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 207, § 11 (West 2007)
(stating that ―[n]o marriage shall be contracted in this commonwealth by a party residing and
intending to continue to reside in another jurisdiction if such marriage would be void if contracted in
such other jurisdiction‖). Currently, under chapter 207, section 11, only couples from New Mexico,
New York, and Rhode Island are allowed to obtain valid marriage licenses, as these are the only
states where same-sex marriage is not clearly prohibited by law. See Cote-Whiteacre v. Dep‘t of
Pub. Health, No. 04-2656, 2006 WL 3208758, at *4 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Sept. 29, 2006) (finding that
Rhode Island law does not prohibit same-sex marriage); David Abel, Same-Sex Couples From N.M.
Allowed to Marry in Mass., BOSTON GLOBE, July 27, 2007, at B3 (discussing the Massachusetts
Department of Public Health‘s ruling that New Mexico does not explicitly ban gay marriage); C.M.
v. C.C., 867 N.Y.S.2d 884, 887–88 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008) (holding that same-sex marriages performed
in Massachusetts are valid in New York, absent contrary legislative action).
51. For a brief summary of these domicile and durational residency requirements, see
KINDREGAN & INKER, supra note 32, §§ 26:19, 27:4; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208,
§§ 4–5 (West 2007).
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2. Rhode Island
In May 2004, shortly after Massachusetts officially recognized same-sex
marriages, Margaret R. Chambers and Cassandra B. Ormiston legally married
in Fall River, Massachusetts.52 In October 2006, the couple sought to dissolve
their marriage, and Ms. Chambers accordingly filed a petition for divorce in
Rhode Island Family Court.53 On December 11, 2006, the family court
certified to the Rhode Island Supreme Court ―a question as to whether or not
the family court [had] subject matter jurisdiction to grant a petition for divorce
with respect to a same-sex couple.‖54
In a 3-2 decision, the Rhode Island Supreme Court ruled that the family
court lacked jurisdiction to grant such a petition. 55 The court based its
decision in part on a dictionary definition of marriage from 1961, the year the
act creating the Rhode Island Family Court became law. 56 Based on this
definition, the court concluded ―there [was] absolutely no reason to believe
that, when the act creating the family court became law in 1961, the
legislators understood the word marriage to refer to any state other than ‗the
state of being united to a person of the opposite sex.‘‖ 57 According to the
Rhode Island Supreme Court, whether to grant jurisdiction to the family court
to divorce same-sex couples was a question of policy to be left to the
legislature.58 Thus, Ms. Chambers and Ms. Ormiston‘s divorce petition was
dismissed, and ―[l]awyers have said Ormiston and Chambers could get
divorced if one [of them] moved to Massachusetts and lived there for a
year.‖59
Understandably, both partners were unwilling to do so because, in Ms.
Ormiston‘s words, ―[t]o move to Massachusetts when I own a home here [in
Rhode Island] is an unfair and unreasonable burden that no other citizen has
to bear.‖60 This case, therefore, highlights the unique difficulties that samesex couples often encounter when trying to dissolve their marriage. As
mentioned earlier, states impose these difficulties when they close the
courthouse doors to same-sex divorcees, forcing the couples to return to the
52. Edward Fitzpatrick, R.I. High Court Rules Against Divorce in Same-Sex Marriages,
PROVIDENCE
J.,
Dec.
8,
2007,
at
A1,
available
at
http://www.projo.com/news/courts/content/same_sex_divorce_12-0807_6D869Q6_v18.2709228.html.
53. Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 958–59 (R.I. 2007).
54. Id.
55. Chambers, 935 A.2d at 958, 967; Fitzpatrick, supra note 52.
56. Chambers, 935 A.2d at 961–63.
57. Id. at 962 (quoting WEBSTER‘S THIRD INT‘L DICTIONARY 1384 (Philip Gove ed., 1961)).
58. Id. at 966–67.
59. Fitzpatrick, supra note 52; see also supra note 42 and accompanying text.
60. Fitzpatrick, supra note 52.

628

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[92:617

state of marriage or civil union to achieve appropriate legal dissolution of the
relationship under the laws of that state. 61 As the case of Ms. Chambers and
Ms. Ormiston demonstrates, however, this often involves a significant burden
on the couple, such as establishing domicile within the state of marriage and
meeting any durational residency requirements.62 It is clear from this case
that these difficulties are real and that they hold real consequences for samesex couples, such as not being able to divorce at all. Later, this Comment will
examine in detail the implications of a state‘s adoption of such a no-divorce
policy for same-sex couples.63
3. New York
While the Rhode Island case serves as an example of banning same-sex
couples outright from access to the courts for divorce, the contrasting New
York case of Gonzalez v. Green64 shows a court‘s approval of a homosexual
couple‘s dissolution based on contract law. David Gonzalez and Steven
Green were married in Massachusetts in February 2005.65 The relationship
did not last, however, and in September 2005, Mr. Green‘s attorney drafted a
―separation agreement‖ for the parties, which was designed to ―confirm their
separation and make arrangements in connection therewith, including the
settlement of their property rights, and other rights and obligations growing
out of the marriage relation.‖66 In other words, this document was a typical
separation agreement, similar in content to those often executed by divorcing
heterosexual couples. 67 Mr. Green and Mr. Gonzalez fully executed the
agreement on September 21 and 22, 2005, and on January 20, 2006, Mr.
Gonzalez filed an ―Action [f]or [a] Divorce‖ in the New York County
Supreme Court.68
Several months following Mr. Gonzalez‘s filing, New York‘s highest
court, the court of appeals, ruled in Hernandez v. Robles69 that ―the New York
Constitution does not compel recognition of marriages between members of
the same sex,‖ indicating that refusing to grant marriage licenses to same-sex

61. See supra Part I.
62. For a brief summary of these domicile and durational residency requirements, see
KINDREGAN & INKER, supra note 32, §§ 26:19, 27:4; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208,
§§ 4–5 (West 2007).
63. See infra Part III.A.
64. 831 N.Y.S.2d 856 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006).
65. Id. at 857.
66. Id.
67. For a rough example of such an agreement, often termed a ―marital settlement agreement,‖
see LEONARD L. LOEB ET AL., SYSTEM BOOK FOR FAMILY LAW 8-20–8-34 (6th ed. 2007).
68. Gonzalez, 831 N.Y.S.2d at 857–58.
69. 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006).
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couples passed New York constitutional muster. 70 Following this ruling, Mr.
Green filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Mr.
Gonzalez‘s petition for divorce, as well as rescission of the separation
agreement.71 Mr. Green put forward several grounds for rescission, including
failure of consideration, violation of public policy, and mutual mistake, all of
which were based on the argument that the parties never had a valid marriage
under either Massachusetts or New York law. 72
The court in Gonzalez agreed that the parties never had a valid marriage,
and therefore dismissed the plaintiff‘s ―Action for a Divorce.‖73 As to the
separation agreement, however, the court employed basic contract principles
in upholding its validity. According to the court, ―‗while cohabitation without
marriage does not give rise to the property and financial rights which
normally attend the marital relation, neither does cohabitation disable the
parties from making an agreement within the normal rules of contract law.‘‖ 74
Thus, the court was unwilling to nullify the agreement on public policy
grounds because it did not want to infringe upon the parties‘ freedom of
contract.
The court similarly dismissed the defendant‘s failure of
consideration and mutual mistake arguments and ultimately ruled that the
agreement was ―valid and in full force and effect.‖75 This case provides an
excellent example of a court‘s reliance on contract principles to facilitate
same-sex divorce, and it will serve as a helpful tool when this Comment in
Part III examines using such a method in Wisconsin.
Gonzalez was not, however, the last word on same-sex divorce in the New
York courts. In the most recent development, the New York courts have
faced a challenge to the holding in Gonzalez that the parties never had a valid
marriage. This challenge occurred in the case of C.M. v. C.C.,76 in which a
same-sex couple who had been married in Massachusetts sought a divorce in
the New York court system. 77 This was the same situation as that presented
by the parties in Gonzalez, yet the court in C.M. refused to nullify the parties‘
70. Id. at 5, 12.
71. Gonzalez, 831 N.Y.S.2d at 858.
72. Id. In Gonzalez, the court found the parties‘ marriage to be null and void in Massachusetts
because of a statute that nullified marriages contracted in Massachusetts by same-sex couples
planning to reside in a state where such a marriage would be void. Id. at 858–59 (citing MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 207, § 11 (West 2007)). The court also found the marriage to be null and void under
New York law because the state statutes governing marriage impliedly limited its availability to
opposite-sex couples, and the court of appeals‘ decision in Robles upheld the constitutionality of this
limitation. Gonzalez, 831 N.Y.S.2d at 857–58 (citing Robles, 855 N.E.2d at 6, 12).
73. Gonzalez, 831 N.Y.S.2d at 859.
74. Id. (quoting Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1156 (N.Y. 1980)).
75. Gonzalez, 831 N.Y.S.2d at 860–61.
76. 867 N.Y.S.2d 884 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008).
77. Id. at 885.
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Massachusetts marriage as the court in Gonzalez had done. Instead, the court
in C.M. held that
[t]here is nothing in the holding of Hernandez [v. Robles]78 to
suggest that the Court of Appeals intended to place same sex
marriages, validly authorized by other states or countries, into
the narrow category of abhorrent conduct for which comity or
full faith and credit should not apply in a divorce
proceeding.79
Thus, because it found that neither New York law, Massachusetts law, nor
public policy prevented recognition of the Massachusetts marriage, the court
in C.M. officially recognized the marriage and, therefore, held that it had
jurisdiction over the divorce action. 80
The court in C.M. based this holding in part on the New York Supreme
Court, Appellate Division‘s decision in Martinez v. County of Monroe,81 in
which the court held that neither the New York Court of Appeals‘ decision in
Robles nor the public policy of the state of New York prohibited recognition
of the plaintiff‘s same-sex marriage, which was performed in Canada. 82
Because the court recognized this marriage, it granted the plaintiff the
protection of the New York sexual orientation discrimination laws. 83 The
court in C.M., after discussing the Martinez court‘s recognition of the
Canadian marriage and noting that the court‘s decision in Gonzalez could not
be reconciled with the Martinez decision, refused to adopt the portion of the

78. 855 N.E.2d 1, 12 (N.Y. 2006).
79. C.M., 867 N.Y.S.2d at 887. Essentially, then, the courts in Gonzalez and C.M. simply
differed in their interpretations of Robles, with the former believing it affirmatively prohibited samesex marriages in New York, and the latter reasoning that it merely required the legislature to speak
directly to the availability of same-sex marriage, refusing itself to either prohibit or require it. Id.;
Gonzalez, 831 N.Y.S.2d 856.
80. C.M., 867 N.Y.S.2d at 887–89. The court in C.M. also analyzed whether the marriage was
invalid in Massachusetts on account of the Massachusetts Superior Court‘s decision in CoteWhiteacre v. Department of Public Health, No. 04-2656, 2006 WL 3208758 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Sept.
29, 2006). C.M., 867 N.Y.S.2d at 889. In Cote-Whiteacre, the court found that ―same-sex marriage
is prohibited in New York,‖ based solely on the New York Court of Appeals‘ decision in Robles.
Cote-Whiteacre, 2006 WL 3208758, at *2. The court in C.M. noted, however, that according to the
Massachusetts courts, same-sex marriage became prohibited in New York only as of the date of the
Robles decision. C.M., 867 N.Y.S.2d at 889. Because the C.M. plaintiff‘s marriage predated the
Robles decision, it was not prohibited by New York law at the time, and thus was valid under
Massachusetts law, allowing the court to recognize its validity in New York. Id.
81. 850 N.Y.S.2d 740 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008).
82. Id. at 743; see also Beth R. v. Donna M., 853 N.Y.S.2d 501, 504–06 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008)
(holding that principles of comity dictated recognizing the validity of parties‘ Canadian same-sex
marriage).
83. Martinez, 850 N.Y.S.2d at 743.
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Gonzalez decision prohibiting recognition of a same-sex marriage performed
in Massachusetts.84 Thus, based on the C.M. and Martinez decisions, it
appears that New York will recognize the validity of same-sex marriages from
at least Massachusetts and Canada and apply New York laws to the members
of such unions.
These decisions, combined with that of Gonzalez v. Green,85 provide
excellent examples of the multiple ways states can choose to handle same-sex
divorce. The contractual-relationship method employed by the court in
Gonzalez and the application of state law to same-sex unions favored by the
courts in C.M. and Martinez show that there are viable options outside
complete bans on court access for same-sex divorces. With this in mind, this
Comment now turns to an examination of same-sex marriage in Wisconsin,
followed by a discussion of how Wisconsin courts might implement these and
other options.
C. Same-Sex Marriage in Wisconsin
Before examining how Wisconsin should handle the possibility of samesex divorce, it is helpful to first discuss Wisconsin‘s background and history
relating to same-sex marriage. By statute, the Wisconsin Legislature has
defined marriage as ―a legal relationship between 2 equal persons, a husband
and wife, who owe to each other mutual responsibility and support.‖86
Therefore, under this and other Wisconsin laws, same-sex couples are clearly
and specifically banned from obtaining legal marriage within the state of
Wisconsin or from having a marriage obtained in another state recognized by
the Wisconsin government. 87
Wisconsin took this ban one step further in 2006 when its citizens voted to
amend the state constitution to ban recognition of out-of-state civil unions and
same-sex marriages. 88 The Wisconsin amendment states, ―Only a marriage
84.
85.
86.
87.

C.M., 867 N.Y.S.2d at 887.
831 N.Y.S.2d 856 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006).
WIS. STAT. § 765.001(2) (2007–2008).
See WIS. STAT. § 765.04(1) (2007–2008). This section reads, in relevant part:
If any person residing and intending to continue to reside in this state who is . . .
prohibited from contracting marriage under the laws of this state goes into
another state or country and there contracts a marriage prohibited or declared
void under the laws of this state, such marriage shall be void for all purposes in
this state with the same effect as though it had been entered into in this state.

Id.
88. Bill Glauber, Election 2006: Marriage, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 8, 2006, at 9A; see
also WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § 13. The legality of this constitutional amendment was recently
challenged in the Dane County Circuit Court, when a University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh professor
alleged that the amendment was improperly presented to voters. Stacy Forster, Judge Upholds
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between one man and one woman shall be valid or recognized as a marriage
in [Wisconsin],‖ and a ―legal status identical or substantially similar to that of
marriage for unmarried individuals shall not be valid or recognized in
[Wisconsin].‖89 Because same-sex marriage already was barred by statute,
this amendment‘s primary effect was to ban the recognition of civil unions
formed in other states and to thereby deny same-sex couples any rights or
privileges they may have enjoyed as a result of such a union. 90 Ultimately,
the statutes and this constitutional amendment make it clear that Wisconsin‘s
public policy is strongly against recognition of same-sex unions, which
certainly will affect Wisconsin courts‘ willingness to dissolve such
relationships.
III. SAME-SEX DIVORCE IN WISCONSIN: OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Although there have been no cases, as there were in Rhode Island and
New York, where a local same-sex couple has turned to the Wisconsin courts
for dissolution of either a civil union or marriage obtained in another state, the
situation undoubtedly will arise based on the expanding recognition of such
unions across the United States. 91 When that situation occurs, the Wisconsin
courts will have at least three options for handling the same-sex divorce: 1)
bar the couple from access to the courts for such proceedings; 2) allow the
parties into court and apply Wisconsin law to adjudicate the divorce; or 3)
allow the parties into court and apply the law of the state where the
relationship was founded. The rest of this Comment will examine these
options in detail, discussing their relative advantages, disadvantages, and
justifications.

State’s Ban on Gay Marriage, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 31, 2008, at B3. The UW-Oshkosh
professor claimed that ―two separate subjects were presented to voters‖ and argued that the propriety
of same-sex marriage is an issue distinct from that of ―other similar legal relationships, such as civil
unions.‖ Id. Under the Wisconsin Constitution, ―if more than one amendment be submitted [to the
voters], they shall be submitted in such manner that the people may vote for or against such
amendments separately.‖ WIS. CONST. art. XII, § 1. The court ultimately dismissed the professor‘s
complaint, however, holding that the constitutional amendment ―fully complied with the
requirements of Wis. Const. art. XII, § 1, in that it properly included two propositions that both
related to the same subject matter, and were designed to accomplish the same general purpose.‖
McConkey v. Van Hollen, No. 07-CV-2657, 2008 WL 5503993, at *1 (Wis. Cir. Ct. June 9, 2008).
89. WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § 13.
90. Glauber, supra note 88.
91. See sources cited supra note 2 and accompanying text.

2009]

SAME-SEX DIVORCE AND WISCONSIN COURTS

633

A. Option 1: Outright Ban
1. Implications and Consequences
Wisconsin‘s first, and perhaps simplest, option for dealing with same-sex
divorce is to impose an outright ban on access to the courts for this
proceeding. In doing so, the courts would align themselves with the state‘s
apparent policy against same-sex marriage, embodied by the recent
constitutional amendment.92 Similar to Wisconsin‘s amendment banning
same-sex marriage, a common-law ban on the use of Wisconsin courts for
same-sex divorce would be consistent with the people of Wisconsin‘s
apparently negative view toward granting homosexual couples the rights,
benefits, and incidents of heterosexual marriage. 93
The counterargument, however, is that courts should not be allowed to
make this type of sweeping policy judgment. More specifically, policy
decisions such as this are better left to the legislature, as exemplified by
Wisconsin‘s prohibitory statutes and constitutional amendment. 94 However, it
is actually because of this constitutional amendment that the ―judicial
activism‖ argument fails. When told that it should not make policy decisions
better left to the legislature, a court could simply reply that it is interpreting
the law in accordance with the stated policy of the legislature and the people
of Wisconsin, as embodied by the statutes and the constitution.
If Wisconsin courts did choose to close their doors to potential same-sex
divorcees, what options would these couples have? Most likely, the couple
would be forced to return to the courts of the state where their relationship
was legally validated and sever the relationship there. 95 The couple could
also, however, make a private agreement to divide the property gained during
the relationship, as well as to establish each individual‘s rights and
responsibilities following separation. 96
This, however, would hardly
constitute sufficient certainty as to the parties‘ rights and remedies in the
event of a subsequent breach of the agreement, as there would be no guarantee

92. See WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § 13.
93. See, e.g., Stacy Forster, Distant Gay Nuptials Defy Obscure Law: California Weddings
Could Draw Prosecution in Wisconsin, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 3, 2008, at B1 (referencing
WIS. STAT. §§ 765.04 and 765.30(1)(a) (2007–2008), which, collectively, would subject same-sex
couples who married in another state to criminal prosecution, with a possible fine of $10,000 and up
to nine months in prison); Bill Glauber, Marriage Measure Backer Savors Win: She Prepares for
Future After Amendment, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 9, 2006, at A9 (describing the intense
lobbying efforts of one citizen‘s group in support of the Wisconsin constitutional amendment
banning gay marriage).
94. WIS. STAT. §§ 765.001(2), 765.04(1) (2007–2008); Glauber, supra note 93, at A9.
95. See, e.g., Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956 (R.I. 2007).
96. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Green, 831 N.Y.S.2d 856 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006).
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that they would be allowed into court to litigate such a separation dispute. 97 If
they were denied access, perhaps because of the courts‘ complete ban on
anything resembling same-sex divorce, the agreement likely would be useless
and the parties would end up seeking a divorce in court in the original state
anyway. Therefore, it is unlikely that any such solution would be either longlasting or satisfactory for the parties, particularly given the discord that
frequently accompanies a divorce.
The likelihood of forced travel, along with its attendant difficulties, seems
to make an outright ban on same-sex divorce unfair to the affected
individuals. More specifically, is it fair to the parties involved to force them
to travel cross-country to dissolve their legal relationship, especially
considering the relatively low burden of adjudicating these disputes in the
Wisconsin court system? Given the Wisconsin divorce rate, 98 the court
system obviously deals frequently with marriage dissolution. Balanced
against the courts‘ familiarity with divorce matters, of course, is the often
protracted and litigious nature of actions for divorce. 99 On the other hand, the
2000 U.S. Census indicated that at that time, only 0.7% of Wisconsin
households were headed by same-sex partners.100 Though that number has
risen since 2000,101 it is still not large enough to infer that state courts would
be inundated with same-sex divorce requests.
Such an inundation seems particularly unlikely given that the only couples
who would actually seek legal dissolution are those who have had their
relationship legally recognized in another state102 and have subsequently taken
97. If the Wisconsin courts were willing to view such a separation agreement as merely a
private contract by which the parties agreed to order their affairs, there is little doubt that the parties
could litigate their dispute in the Wisconsin courts. See Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303, 306 (1987)
(―Courts traditionally have settled contract and property disputes between unmarried persons, some
of whom have cohabited.‖). If, however, the courts chose to view the agreement as an instrument of
divorce under the ―outright ban‖ method (i.e., a complete refusal to entertain any action even
resembling same-sex divorce), the court may prevent itself from hearing the dispute.
98. In 2006, the number of divorces in Wisconsin equaled 50% of the number of marriages in
the same year, or 16,730 divorces. WIS. DEP‘T OF HEALTH & FAMILY SERVS., supra note 4, at 12.
99. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 831 N.Y.S.2d 856; see also Fitzpatrick, supra note 52.
100. Tavia Simmons & Martin O‘Connell, Married-Couple and Unmarried-Partner
Households: 2000, in CENSUS 2000 SPECIAL REPORTS (U.S. Dep‘t of Commerce, Census Bureau ed.,
2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr-5.pdf.
101. One study indicates that from 2000 to 2005, the number of same-sex couples in Wisconsin
rose from 8,232 to 14,894, an increase of 81%. GARY J. GATES, SAME-SEX COUPLES AND THE GAY,
LESBIAN, BISEXUAL POPULATION : NEW ESTIMATES FROM THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY,
app. 1 (UCLA Law Sch. Williams Inst. on Sexual Orientation ed., 2006), available at
http://www.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/publications/SameSexCouplesandGLBpopACS.pdf.
102. Obviously, such legal recognition would have to occur outside of Wisconsin, given
Wisconsin‘s current statutory and constitutional blocks to same-sex marriage. See WIS. CONST. art.
XIII, § 13; WIS. STAT. §§ 765.001(2), 765.04(1) (2007–2008) (prohibiting, collectively, both samesex marriage and same-sex civil unions).
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up Wisconsin residence. Because this number is likely small, and the number
of such couples actually seeking legal dissolution is even smaller, an outright
ban probably cannot be justified on the grounds of judicial economy or
efficiency. Indeed, a willingness to adjudicate same-sex divorces actually is
supported by concerns for national judicial economy, as courts in states
recognizing same-sex marriage would not be forced to deal with the
administrative issues and inefficiencies that typically accompany adjudication
of disputes involving out-of-state litigants. Therefore, there does not seem to
be any reason, outside of Wisconsin‘s apparent public policy against same-sex
marriage, for denying same-sex couples access to the Wisconsin courts for
legal dissolution.
2. Counterarguments to an Outright Ban
Despite Wisconsin‘s apparently clear policy against same-sex marriage,
that policy, by itself, should not preclude discussion of the arguments against
opening the Wisconsin courts to same-sex divorcees. Arguments against an
outright ban on same-sex divorce, which this section will explore, include the
following: 1) because Wisconsin law apparently recognizes same-sex
partners‘ rights against one another in contexts other than marriage, it should
consider giving them rights to divorce; and 2) same-sex marriage and samesex divorce are fundamentally different procedures, and the public policy
against same-sex marriage, therefore, should not automatically preclude samesex divorce.
Although it is rarely, if ever, stated explicitly within the Wisconsin
statutes, there are areas of Wisconsin law that appear to protect, or can be
interpreted to protect, the rights of same-sex partners against one another.
One such area is domestic abuse, which is governed by section 968.075 of the
Wisconsin Statutes.103 This statute defines ―domestic abuse‖ as the
commission, by an adult person, of any of the statutorily defined actions
―against his or her spouse or former spouse, against an adult with whom the
person resides or formerly resided or against an adult with whom the person
has a child in common.‖104 Because this definition does not explicitly apply
only to heterosexual couples (as the statutes governing marriage do 105), it is
certainly reasonable to conclude that the legislature intended this section to
protect homosexual victims of domestic violence as well.
Although there is no case law in Wisconsin where this statute has been
used to protect a homosexual partner, there is plenty of evidence that samesex domestic violence is a real threat and that this statute should, therefore, be
103. WIS. STAT. § 968.075 (2007–2008).
104. Id. § 968.075(1)(a).
105. See, e.g., id. § 765.001(2).
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construed to protect same-sex partners. According to one report, domestic
violence in same-sex relationships occurs at about the same rate as
heterosexual relationships, or as high as between 25% and 33%. 106 Given the
high incidence of same-sex domestic violence, it is not unreasonable to
believe that the Wisconsin Legislature actually intended Wisconsin domestic
violence law to protect same-sex partners.107
Admittedly, statutory protection against domestic violence is far from
recognizing same-sex divorce. However, this statutory protection does show
that Wisconsin law is not entirely devoid of recognition of rights for members
of same-sex couples. Just as members of heterosexual couples can be
reassured that the law protects them against violence by their partners,
members of homosexual couples know that the law extends to them as well.
From this extension, it is reasonable to conclude that the Wisconsin
Legislature is not completely averse to granting those in same-sex
relationships access to the court system, particularly for matters involving
their partners. Certainly, access for domestic violence would not lead, by
itself, to a conclusion that individuals in same-sex relationships should have
court access for divorce purposes. Access would provide evidence, however,
that the courtroom doors have opened before to allow those in same-sex
relationships to assert their rights against their partners, as well as provide a
reasonable basis for same-sex couples to believe the doors can, and should, be
opened further.
Another area of law where same-sex couples appear to have an opening
for increased rights is Wisconsin‘s common law regarding cohabitation.
Given the marked increase in cohabitation across the United States in recent
decades,108 it is not surprising that many states have recognized certain rights
arising from a cohabiting relationship. 109 While there certainly is a broad
spectrum as to the amount and breadth of these rights, there is no doubt that
states are adapting to the societal shift toward cohabitation.

106. Connie Burk, Think, Re-think: Domestic Violence in Lesbian, Bisexual and Trans
Relationships, WIS. COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, Summer 1999, at 2.
107. This belief is bolstered by the legislative history of section 968.075, which states that
Wisconsin‘s domestic violence law was created so that criminal laws would be ―enforced without
regard to the relationship of the persons involved.‖ Act of April 21, 1988, 1987 Wis. Sess. Laws
1229, 1229.
108. See, e.g., Eric Nagourney, Study Finds Families Bypassing Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
15, 2000, at F8.
109. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976); Glasgo v. Glasgo, 410 N.E.2d
1325, 1327 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Connell v. Diehl, 938 A.2d 143, 145 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2008). But see Costa v. Oliven, 849 N.E.2d 122, 123–24 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (explaining that public
policy precluded a holding that the plaintiff was entitled to an equitable interest in his cohabitant‘s
property).
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Wisconsin joined these states in 1987, with the case of Watts v. Watts.110
In Watts, the plaintiff and the defendant had cohabited for twelve years, and
the relationship produced two children. 111 Once the relationship ended, the
plaintiff filed suit seeking an accounting of the defendant‘s personal and
business assets accumulated during the cohabitation and a determination of
her share of such assets.112 The Wisconsin Supreme Court ultimately held
that, although the plaintiff‘s claim to the property acquired during the
relationship could not rest on the property division statute in place at the time
(i.e., the divorce statute), it could rest on ―contract, unjust enrichment or
partition.‖113 The court specifically stated:
Courts traditionally have settled contract and property
disputes between unmarried persons, some of whom have
cohabited. Nonmarital cohabitation does not render every
agreement between the cohabiting parties illegal and does not
automatically preclude one of the parties from seeking
judicial relief, such as statutory or common law partition,
damages for breach of express or implied contract,
constructive trust and quantum meruit where the party
alleges, and later proves, facts supporting the legal theory. 114
Based on the Watts case, then, it is clear that Wisconsin law recognizes
rights of cohabiting partners, and that these rights are grounded in contract
theory.
As with the domestic violence statute discussed above,115 there is no case
law regarding the Watts case‘s applicability to same-sex couples. Based on
the court‘s statements quoted above, however, the dissolution of a cohabiting
relationship has been characterized by Wisconsin courts as a contract or
property dispute. Additionally, the Wisconsin Supreme Court failed to
explicitly limit the rights of cohabiting parties, following dissolution of the
relationship, to heterosexual couples. By failing to do so, the court apparently
left the door open for cohabiting, homosexual couples to seek resolution of
their separation disputes in the court system, guided by established principles
of contract law.116
110. 137 Wis. 2d 506, 405 N.W.2d 303 (1987).
111. Id. at 510, 405 N.W.2d at 305.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 538, 405 N.W.2d at 316.
114. Id. at 511–12, 405 N.W.2d at 306.
115. WIS. STAT. § 968.075 (2007–2008).
116. Given the age of the Watts case (decided more than twenty years ago), it is certainly
possible, and perhaps even likely, that the Wisconsin Supreme Court did not consider its decision‘s
ramifications for same-sex couples. However, as the decision does not bar same-sex couples from
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Obviously, contract disputes occur between all types of people, male and
female, gay and straight. It is unlikely (and probably a violation of the federal
Equal Protection Clause) that a court could, or would, refuse to handle a
property dispute because of the parties‘ gender or sexual orientation. 117
Therefore, because two homosexual people would have access to the court to
resolve any basic, or ―normal,‖ contractual or property disputes, it does not
seem unreasonable to extend this access to implied or express contracts based
on the parties‘ cohabitation. 118 And, one could argue, if homosexual couples
who are merely cohabiting are granted access to the courts for the
enforcement of rights, then homosexual couples who have achieved a valid
marriage or civil union in another state should certainly have court access for
the dissolution of the contractual relationship created by such out-of-state
unions. 119
The second major argument against an outright ban on same-sex divorce
is that the public policy behind banning same-sex marriage is not directly
applicable to same-sex divorce. More specifically, the fact that same-sex
divorce is a process different and separate from same-sex marriage means that
recognition of such divorce presents no significant public policy issues. To
understand this argument, it is necessary to first examine the distinction it
makes between same-sex marriage and same-sex divorce.
This distinction is that same-sex divorce is the legal termination of an
essentially contractual relationship, while marriage is the creation of such a
relationship. The primary policy problem always has revolved around the
creation, and not the dissolution, of marriage. In fact, many critics would
likely seek to dissolve as many of these relationships as possible. Supporters
of same-sex divorce would, therefore, argue that a court‘s recognition of this

seeking contractual remedies following the dissolution of a cohabiting relationship, there is no reason
to doubt that such couples could use the court system to obtain these remedies.
117. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2; see, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624, 635–36
(1996) (striking down, on equal protection grounds, a Colorado constitutional amendment that
―prohibit[ed] all legislative, executive or judicial action at any level of state or local government
designed to protect . . . homosexual persons‖).
118. The biggest possible problem with this extension is whether the implied contract that
grants rights to the cohabiting parties is based on living in a marriage-like relationship. If there is
such a requirement, it is highly unlikely that the Wisconsin courts would recognize such an implied
contract, as it would be contrary to public policy and the Wisconsin Constitution. See WIS. CONST.
art. XIII, § 13 (forbidding recognition of ―[a] legal status identical or substantially similar to that of
marriage for unmarried individuals‖ of the same sex). However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
imposed no such requirement in Watts, meaning there is apparently no black-letter law in Wisconsin
to that effect. An interesting topic, therefore, would be the effect of this constitutional amendment on
Wisconsin law regarding cohabitation, specifically the Watts case. Such a topic, however, is beyond
the scope of this Comment.
119. See, e.g., C.M. v. C.C., 867 N.Y.S.2d 884 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008); Gonzalez v. Green, 831
N.Y.S.2d 856 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006).
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procedure would have no bearing on a state‘s policy regarding the creation of
same-sex marriages. The two processes—one a creation, the other a
dissolution—are fundamentally different (although they are of course linked),
and because of this difference, the argument goes, it is entirely possible for a
court to recognize same-sex divorce without recognizing same-sex marriage.
The problem with this argument, however, is two-fold. First, many
people may consider recognition of same-sex divorce a de facto recognition of
same-sex marriage and condemn it as a mere end-around to avoid the
constitutional and statutory bans.120 These people may be concerned that
granting same-sex couples the right to seek a divorce would undercut the
effectiveness of these bans by expanding the rights of, and therefore the legal
recognition of, same-sex couples. Second, as a doctrinal matter, it is difficult
to discern how a court could logically dissolve a relationship it does not
recognize in the first place. For same-sex couples to avoid the first problem,
it would likely be necessary to categorize their relationship as something other
than a marriage, such as a civil union. However, while this may solve the first
problem, it does not solve the logical inconsistency created by the Wisconsin
Constitutional amendment discussed earlier.121 Because this amendment
basically denies recognition of civil unions, the courts still would be asked to
dissolve a relationship they cannot legally recognize. 122 Because of this
logical and ultimately legal obstacle, supporters of same-sex divorce likely
would have a difficult time finding a sufficient lack of connection between
same-sex marriage and divorce to placate those opposed to legal recognition
of either or both legal processes.
Ultimately, there are several arguments on both sides regarding an
outright ban on same-sex divorce in the Wisconsin courts. Imposing such a
ban would have obvious consequences for same-sex couples whose
relationship is legally recognized in another state, and would further cement
Wisconsin‘s position as decidedly anti-same-sex marriage. Of the three
possible options for dealing with same-sex divorce, an outright ban is the
most extreme, at least in terms of the denial of rights to same-sex couples.
That said, however, as the recent constitutional amendment shows, Wisconsin
120. See, e.g., Anemona Hartocollis, Gay Marriage Gains Notice in State Court, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 6, 2008, at B1 (discussing the various forms of recognition of same-sex marriage in New York
state, including through granting such couples a divorce, and noting the negative reaction to such
recognition by opponents of same-sex marriage).
121. See WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § 13, discussed supra, Part II.C.
122. Indeed, this logical, legal obstacle could mean that Wisconsin‘s current policy (if it can be
said to have one, as the need to define such a policy has not yet arisen) is in fact an outright ban.
Because of the statutory and constitutional prohibitions, courts probably could not simply process
same-sex divorce petitions as they would opposite-sex petitions, as this would force them to
recognize the couple‘s legal relationship, in violation of law. Courts could avoid this problem,
however, by adopting either of Options 2 or 3, discussed infra Part III.B–C.
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is not averse to taking aggressive positions when it comes to same-sex
marriage.
B. Option 2: Apply Wisconsin Law
The second possibility for solving the potential same-sex divorce problem
is to apply Wisconsin law to such actions. In doing so, Wisconsin courts
could choose to apply Wisconsin divorce law, or in the alternative, Wisconsin
contract law. Each of these options presents various difficulties and
advantages that will be discussed in detail below.
1. Divorce Law
One possibility for utilizing Wisconsin law in adjudicating same-sex
divorce petitions would be to apply the divorce statutes equally to
heterosexual and homosexual couples. The two groups would have
substantially the same rights under the law and would have equal access to the
Wisconsin courts for the dissolution of their contractual relationships. For
several reasons, however, this option is highly unlikely, and most likely
contrary to the Wisconsin Constitution. 123
A Wisconsin court‘s attempt to apply Wisconsin divorce statutes likely
would violate both the Wisconsin Statutes and the Wisconsin Constitution. In
particular, section 767.35 of the Wisconsin Statutes provides that ―[a] court
shall grant a judgment of divorce . . . if . . . the court finds that the marriage is
irretrievably broken . . . .‖124 This provision, combined with section
765.001(2), which defines marriage as ―a legal relationship between 2 equal
persons, a husband and wife,‖ shows that Wisconsin law currently extends
divorce privileges only to married couples, and therefore only to heterosexual
couples.125 Additionally, under the constitutional amendment discussed
above, 126 it is unlawful for any court to recognize a same-sex marriage, or
even a same-sex marriage-like relationship. Based on Wisconsin public
policy and existing laws banning same-sex marriage, the Wisconsin courts
and legislature would likely include even a de facto recognition of same-sex
marriage in this constitutional ban, which would be accomplished as a result
of performing a judicial dissolution of a same-sex marriage using Wisconsin
law.

123.
124.
125.
126.

See WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § 13; supra note 118 and accompanying text.
WIS. STAT. § 767.35(1)(b) (2007–2008) (emphasis added).
Id. § 765.001(2).
WIS. CONST. art XIII, § 13, discussed supra Part II.C.
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2. Contract Law127
A second option Wisconsin courts would have in applying Wisconsin law
to same-sex divorce would be to apply basic principles of contract law to the
relationship. More specifically, the courts could view same-sex marriages and
civil unions as relationships of cohabitation and look to the doctrines of
implied contract, unjust enrichment, or promissory estoppel in determining
the parties‘ rights following the dissolution of the legal relationship entered
into in a different state. Just as the Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed to apply
these principles to the dissolution of heterosexual cohabitation relationships in
Watts v. Watts,128 Wisconsin courts could simply expand this application to
same-sex divorce.
The primary benefit of treating same-sex divorces as contract disputes is
that it offers a forum to same-sex couples while avoiding the statutory
violations that would likely attend resolving the dispute under Wisconsin
divorce laws.129 Rather than recognizing a same-sex marriage, the courts
merely would be acknowledging the existence of a contractual relationship
between the parties and using established contract principles to resolve the
parties‘ dispute.130 Granted, this may appear to critics as nothing more than a
thinly veiled attempt to achieve recognition of same-sex divorce, and
therefore same-sex marriage. The defining difference, however, is the
substantive law that would be applied. Theoretically, the same-sex couple‘s
court action would never have to mention the word ―divorce,‖ but instead
would rely upon the modification or cancellation of a contract.131
An additional benefit of using contract law to deal with same-sex divorces
would be the added incentive for same-sex couples to draft and execute their
own ―separation agreements,‖ as in the New York case of Gonzalez v.
Green.132 Armed with the confidence that the courts would consistently apply
basic contract principles to any such agreement, the parties would be willing
to invest significant time in drafting a fair and equitable agreement to end the
contractual relationship. This would decrease litigation of such cases and
provide for greater certainty in the law.
127. For an interesting discussion of same-sex marriage as a contractual relationship, see
RICHARD A. P OSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 5.8 (7th ed. 2007).
128. 137 Wis. 2d 506, 538, 405 N.W.2d 303, 316 (1987), discussed supra Part III.A.1.
129. See supra notes 123–26 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Green, 831 N.Y.S.2d 856 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006).
131. As with the solution of applying out-of-state law to Wisconsin divorce actions, applying
Wisconsin contract law to same-sex divorces is not without logistical and administrative difficulties.
Problems such as which contract doctrines to apply, or how the doctrines should be modified to
accommodate the unique issues in divorce cases, are only some of the possible obstacles. Again,
however, an in-depth analysis of these difficulties is beyond the scope of this Comment.
132. 831 N.Y.S.2d 856, 857 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006), discussed supra Part II.B.3.
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That is not to say, however, that this method would be free of difficulties.
First, the protections afforded by divorce law certainly are not identical to
those typically recognized under contract principles. For example, under
Wisconsin divorce law, the party receiving support or maintenance typically
can return to court to seek a revision of the amount or schedule of such
payments.133 There is no similar provision under contract law where a party
can revisit a prior cancellation agreement and seek a court order modifying
the terms of that cancellation. This deficiency, among other discrepancies
between divorce and contract law, may limit the rights that are available to
same-sex couples who seek to dissolve their relationship. These limitations
must be balanced, however, against the costs that would be incurred in
dissolving that relationship in its state of origin. In this situation, limited
rights may seem better than no rights at all. 134
A second difficulty regarding the application of contract principles to
same-sex divorce is the determination of which contract principles would
apply to these types of actions. Specifically, would courts adopt all contract
doctrines, such as mutual mistake, promissory estoppel, and modification, or
would they pick and choose from among the doctrines on a case-by-case
basis, applying some and refusing to apply others? If Wisconsin courts
adopted an inclusive policy, making any and all doctrines applicable,
obviously this would not be a problem. However, given the breadth of
contract law and the general aversion to granting rights to same-sex couples,
the adoption of such an inclusive approach seems unlikely. It is more likely
that the courts would attempt to limit the available doctrines as much as
possible. To that end, the courts would have to determine just how far they
are willing to extend same-sex couples‘ access to legal dissolution of their
contractual relationship.
As an example, consider two same-sex partners who negotiated and
executed a separation agreement that was upheld by the court but
subsequently was breached by one of the parties. Would the court allow the
nonbreaching party to come into court seeking damages, modification of the
agreement, or any other legal or equitable remedies? Or would the court
simply limit its own power to validation of such agreements, leaving it to the
parties to work out any subsequent problems? This is admittedly a somewhat
extreme example, in that the latter option would be a severely limited view of
133. WIS. STAT. § 767.59(1c)(1) (2007–2008).
134. Indeed, the couple from Rhode Island discussed in Part II.B.2 serves as an example of
why same-sex couples seeking a divorce may be willing to accept something less than a full divorce
proceeding. Rather than undergo the hardships associated with moving back to Massachusetts for a
year, the couple instead expressed a willingness to simply remain married. Fitzpatrick, supra note
52. In such a situation, it seems likely that a same-sex couple would gladly accept a legal dissolution
of their ―contract‖ (i.e., their relationship), regardless of whether it was actually labeled a ―divorce.‖

2009]

SAME-SEX DIVORCE AND WISCONSIN COURTS

643

the court‘s power, but it demonstrates the point that courts would have
difficult decisions to make regarding the extent to which they are willing to
involve themselves in the dissolution of same-sex marriages or civil unions.
A third difficulty that courts would encounter in applying contract
principles to same-sex divorces would be the resolution of the ancillary issues
of divorce, such as marital/community property division 135 and spousal
support.136 These issues are rarely, if ever, dealt with in any other context
besides divorce, meaning the court likely would not rely solely on contract
principles in resolving them. Thus, courts would be forced to consult other
areas of law, particularly divorce law, in resolving these matters if the parties
could not agree. Normally this would not be a problem, but given the
sensitive nature of the same-sex marriage and divorce questions, if courts
began applying divorce law to supposed contractual disputes, it could raise the
previously discussed concerns stemming from Wisconsin‘s statutory and
constitutional bans on same-sex marriage. 137

135. Marital/community property has been defined as ―[p]roperty owned in common by
husband and wife as a result of its having been acquired during the marriage by means other than an
inheritance or a gift to one spouse, each spouse holding a one-half interest in the property.‖ BLACK‘S
LAW DICTIONARY 274 (7th ed. 1999). Wisconsin is one of several states to have adopted the
community property system, doing so in 1984 through the passage of the Wisconsin Marital Property
Act. See KEITH A. CHRISTIANSEN ET AL., MARITAL PROPERTY LAW IN WISCONSIN § 1.2 (3d ed.
2004). Although a full discussion of the rights of same-sex spouses under this community property
system is beyond the scope of this Comment, it is important to note that the community property
system could pose significant difficulties for Wisconsin courts attempting to apply Wisconsin
divorce or contract law to same-sex couples. Although the courts likely would hold that because
same-sex couples are not married under Wisconsin law, see WIS. CONST. art XIII, § 13 (banning
same-sex marriage), they have no rights under the community property laws, the issue almost
certainly would be litigated, see WIS. STAT. §§ 766.03(1), 766.01(5) (stating that the marital property
chapter applies to spouses ―upon their determination date,‖ and defining the ―determination date‖ as
the date of the spouses‘ marriage). For further discussion of the impact of community property laws
on same-sex couples in other states, see Charles W. Willey, Effect in Montana of Community-Source
Property Acquired in Another State (and Its Impact on a Montana Marriage Dissolution, Estate
Planning, Property Transfers, and Probate), 69 MONT. L. REV. 313, 357–65 (2008).
136. These examples are only two of the myriad issues that arise in connection with normal
divorce actions, with another being the rights of the parents to custody of the children. This issue can
be particularly troublesome for same-sex parents, as there is no guarantee they will have any
biological or adoptive relation to the children. If a couple has a civil union or other legal
relationship, this may not be an issue if the couple seeks to divorce in the state where they formed
that relationship, as the laws may be sufficiently developed to cover this situation. However, when
the couple moves to a state that does not recognize their union, the nonbiological, nonadoptive parent
could be in serious danger of losing all parental rights. This is yet another example of the difficulties
surrounding same-sex divorce in non-same-sex union states, demonstrating again the care that courts
and legislatures must have in deciding how to handle same-sex divorce requests. For an analysis of
how the nonbiological, nonadoptive parent‘s situation may proceed, see generally Deborah L.
Forman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Parents in the Wake of Gay Marriage, Civil Unions, and
Domestic Partnerships, 46 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2004).
137. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
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Ultimately, although the application of contract law to petitions for samesex divorce is an imperfect solution to the problem discussed in this
Comment, it undoubtedly represents a compromise position that offers
benefits to both sides of the argument. By offering same-sex couples access
to the Wisconsin courts for these proceedings, without formally recognizing
same-sex divorce (and therefore marriage), this solution would seem to
appease, if not reconcile, the groups on either side of the issue.
C. Option 3: Apply the Law from the State of Legal Union
The final, and perhaps most compromising, solution to the same-sex
divorce problem is to allow same-sex couples access to the Wisconsin courts
for divorce purposes, but use the laws of the state where the couple was
legally joined to adjudicate the divorce petition. Whether it was a marriage in
Massachusetts or a civil union in Vermont, the Wisconsin court could simply
inform the parties that the law of their contracting state would govern the
divorce proceeding, and the parties could prepare their cases accordingly.
Applying out-of-state law is not an uncommon occurrence in Wisconsin
courts. Courts routinely apply out-of-state law in several different contexts,
such as rights of spouses, 138 contract rights,139 and torts.140 Thus, in
adjudicating same-sex divorces, Wisconsin courts could simply apply the
divorce laws of the contracting state and thereby effectively resolve any
disputes between the partners regarding the dissolution of the relationship, as
well as issue a legally binding order of such dissolution. Because the parties‘
contracting state obviously would have more experience with same-sex
unions (Wisconsin, of course, has none), hopefully these states would also
have at least partially developed divorce codes. 141 This would make it easier
for Wisconsin courts to preside over judicial dissolutions using out-of-state
law, alleviating any potential concerns over increased judicial workloads.

138. See Xiong v. Xiong, 2002 WI App. 110, ¶14, 255 Wis. 2d 693, ¶14, 648 N.W.2d 900, ¶ 14
(stating that the ―‗law of the matrimonial domicil [sic] governs with respect to the substantial rights
of husband and wife, as between themselves and their privies‘‖) (quoting Jaeger v. Jaeger, 262 Wis.
14, 17, 53 N.W.2d 740, 742 (1952)).
139. See generally Belland v. Allstate Ins. Co., 140 Wis. 2d 391, 393–95, 410 N.W.2d 611,
612–13 (Ct. App. 1987) (deciding whether Illinois, Wisconsin, or Ohio law was applicable to a
family exclusion clause in an insurance contract, following a car accident occurring in Wisconsin).
140. See generally Burns v. Geres, 140 Wis. 2d. 197, 199–201, 409 N.W.2d 428, 430 (Ct. App.
1987) (holding that Arizona‘s, rather than Wisconsin‘s, safe-place statute applied to plaintiff‘s
negligence action).
141. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 4 (West 2007) (detailing divorce procedures
for both heterosexual and homosexual married couples); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1206 (2002) (―The
dissolution of civil unions shall follow the same procedure and be subject to the same substantive
rights and obligations that are involved in the dissolution of marriage . . . .‖).
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This option has several other advantages, with perhaps the most important
being its compromising nature. As mentioned earlier, the ―ban-it-outright‖
position on same-sex divorce carries with it several hardships for same-sex
couples who have been joined in other states and now reside in Wisconsin. 142
That position, however, is also most in line with Wisconsin‘s public policy
against same-sex marriage. To apply the law of the contracting state, on the
other hand, would serve the interests of both Wisconsin public policy and
same-sex couples seeking divorce in Wisconsin.
More specifically, applying out-of-state law would save same-sex couples
from the difficulties associated with returning to the contracting state, such as
complying with domicile and durational residency requirements that typically
pervade divorce statutes.143 Further, it would allow these couples to achieve
the dissolution of their relationship that they would be entitled to had they
remained in the contracting state.144 From a public policy perspective, this
solution does not undermine Wisconsin‘s clearly stated policy judgment that
same-sex marriage is not recognized under Wisconsin law. In applying outof-state law, the courts would essentially serve as conduits of the out-of-state
courts and, at least conceptually, would not be sanctioning same-sex marriage,
either directly or indirectly.
The concerns about the statutory and
constitutional prohibitions of same-sex marriage would be alleviated, and
Wisconsin could serve its same-sex citizens by offering same-sex couples a
forum for divorce without actually recognizing it under the law, and at the
same time protect its public policy against same-sex marriage.
IV. CONCLUSION
None of the solutions presented in this Comment are intended, nor are
they able, to placate all those interested in the question of same-sex divorce in
Wisconsin. They are intended, however, to stimulate discussion on the topic
142. See, e.g., Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956 (R.I. 2007).
143. Of course, this option is not without its own logistical difficulties. For example, applying
Massachusetts law to a same-sex couple‘s divorce petition in Wisconsin theoretically would still
require that the couple satisfy the Massachusetts domicile and durational residency requirements.
For a brief summary of these domicile and durational residency requirements, see KINDREGAN &
INKER, supra note 32, §§ 26:19, 27:4. A concession that would have to be made, likely on both
Massachusetts‘s and Wisconsin‘s part, would be to allow the couple to meet these requirements
through domicile in Wisconsin. As the example illustrates, this solution is clearly imperfect, but
perfection cannot be expected. Implementing any of the solutions presented in this Comment
obviously would pose certain administrative and logistical difficulties, but it is beyond the scope of
this work to examine these in detail.
144. An interesting side note on this point is that such a solution would be more in line with the
parties‘ expectations regarding the out-of-state contract, as they likely would expect to be able to
dissolve the relationship in the court system. This fact seems to provide further evidence that using
out-of-state law to adjudicate what essentially amount to contract disputes would be an efficient
judicial outcome.
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and to provide a framework for analyzing the issue if and when it arises in the
future. There almost certainly will always be staunch supporters and perhaps
even stauncher opponents of increased recognition of rights for same-sex
couples, making the ability to compromise between these positions
paramount.
Regardless of one‘s individual opinion about the matters discussed in this
Comment, there is no doubt that the issue of same-sex divorce is on the rise in
America, and states across the country soon will be forced to establish laws
and policies for handling it.145 When that time comes, these states, including
Wisconsin, will be forced to choose between at least three options: 1) ban
same-sex couples from the courthouse, forcing them to return to their state of
union; 2) apply their own state law to the proceedings, and attempt to navigate
the various constitutional and statutory bans on same-sex marriage; or 3)
compromise and apply the law of the state where the parties‘ legal union was
formed, allowing the parties a judicial remedy and protecting the states‘
public policies against same-sex marriage, where they exist. When the time to
choose does come for Wisconsin, its citizens again will be faced with the
question of extending equal rights to same-sex couples. Hopefully, this time
they will take a more compromising position.
LOUIS THORSON

145. Indeed, shortly before this Comment went to print, a same-sex couple who had been
married in Canada received a legal divorce from a superior court judge in New Jersey. Press
Release, ACLU of N.J., ACLU-N.J. Win Case Allowing Same-Sex Couples to Divorce in N.J. (Feb.
6, 2009), available at http://www.aclu-nj.org/news/aclunjwinscaseallowingsame.htm. Additionally,
a same-sex couple filed for divorce in a Dallas state district court, which is believed to be the first
such action in Texas. Roy Appleton, Dallas Same-Sex Divorce Case a First for Texas, DALLAS
MORNING
NEWS,
Jan.
23,
2009,
at
1A,
available
at
http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/latestnews/stories/012309dnmetgaydivorce.42279
53.html. Although these cases occurred too close to printing to allow an in-depth examination, they
serve as further evidence that the issue of same-sex divorce is spreading quickly to courts across the
nation and may make its way into the Wisconsin courts in the near future.
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